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Asceticism/Askesis:
Foucault's Thinking Historical Subjectivity

Ladelle Me Whorter

In the Introduction to The Use of Pleasure Foucault calls his
work an askesis, "an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought."
The "living substance of philosophy," Foucault writes, is the essay,
"which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the
game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic
appropriation of others for the purpose of communication." 1 Foucault's
work, then, does not simply report to us his conclusions or theories.
Foucault is not primarily interested in imparting information. What
he offers instead is a kind of exercise book.
Hence, if we are to think through Foucault's work, we need first
to think the meaning of the word exercise. An exercise, of course, is
a kind of practice, a practice designed to change the one who
undergoes it. We undertake various programs of exercise in order to
alter ourselves in some way. We engage in physical exercises to
change the contours of our bodies or magnify their strength, to clear
our minds of anger or depression, or to stimulate ourselves for
intellectual work. We engage in mathematical or logic exercises in
order to train ourselves in the patterns of mathematical or logical
thought, as we engage in grammatical exercises in order to discipline
our writing and speech. Exercises are transforming practices,
practices "by which ... one undergoes changes."
243
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An exercise book, then, requires an approach quite different from
most works of professional scholarship. If a typical work of scholarship
is to be understood as simply a report of its author's conclusions,
suggestions, and perhaps still-embryonic ideas, then it may be taken
as a product, the result of an agent's or a subject's having acted to
produce it. As such it is an object to be perceived and judged and
thought about, an object external to and separable from us subjects
who read and judge it. But an exercise book demands to be treated
as a very different kind ofthing. If it is the case that exercise, askesis,
is a transformative practice, then Foucault's exercise books cannot
be adequately comprehended by the notion 'object'. They cannot be
perceived and read and judged by a subject whose being is wholly
external to them. As we have noted, an exercise is a practice whose
very nature it is to alter the practitioner. And that means that the
practitioner (the writer, the reader) and the practice are not external
to one another. As the askesis plays out, the boundaries necessary
for maintaining subjective and objective identities shift and may even
erode.
Exercises are often empowering and enlightening. There may
be very good reasons for engaging in them. However, we who have
Nietzsche's works as part of our heritage have reason to hesitate. In
the wake ofthe third essay in On the Genealogy of Morals, Foucault's
use of the word askesis, from which we get asceticism, cannot help
but make us wince. We cannot help but notice that asceticism, like
Foucault's askesis, denotes self-transforming practice; asceticism, too,
changes the subject who undergoes it. Foucault's use of such a closely
related word forces us to ask the question: Is it possible that Foucault
the neo-Nietzschean in some sneaky or occluded way embraces the
ascetic ideal after all? Is Foucault's askesis just a new twist in the
history of asceticism? Or does it bring with it a possibility for
difference? In pursuit of that question we first need to examine
Nietzsche's genealogy of asceticism.
In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche locates the beginning
of the modern self-a being with interiority, memory, conscience, the
ability to make promises-in a certain fastidiousness, a certain desire
for keeping clean. 2 Modern selfhood begins in a dream of purity, of
the putting aside, the exclusion of whatever appears extraneous,
unnecessary, in excess. Perhaps it begins innocuously enough. This
abstinence is empowering, self-affrrming; it breeds more of itself. And
so a sorting process begins. As this complex of self-affirming drives
intensifies itself, it discounts, excludes, perhaps in some cases denies
that which it now names other.
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Thus modern selfhood is born, and at the same time modern
morality. By a process of sorting out and refusing there comes to be
constituted a world, an "external world," an "evil world" from which
the self rebounds and turns inward, relentlessly seeking that world's
pure opposition, seeking to affirm itself. The modern selfs drive for
self-affirmation is an ascetic drive. What are we modem ascetic selves
seeking? That which is truly ourselves, the pure kernel, the selfidentical core. How shall we find it? Exclude all that merely adorns,
all that clings, all that soils, all that corrupts. Thus asceticism begets
the will to constancy, clarity, reliability, integrity, certainty,
eternality, identity, the Selfsame. Thus asceticism begets the will to
truth.
Nietzsche pulls no punches. It is out of fear that asceticism
begets this will to true identity. In order to perpetuate itself it must
deny its origins in dispersed drives; it must insist upon the existence
of a perfect unity at the heart of things, underlying all that differs
and dies, all that wrecks itself in the winds of change. It must insist
on the persistence of its self-identity in order to continue being what
it is-the drive to purify. To do otherwise is to endanger itself, to risk
itself. And that it will not do; that it is too fearful to do.
Now, we could sit injudgment of Nietzsche's discourse; we could
criticize his logic or his sense ofhistory. We could even out-Nietzsche
him and fault him for reading too much simplicity into things. But
none of that would change the fact that Nietzsche's discourse disturbs,
and we undergo that disturbance, regardless of how we appropriate
it. The discourse appropriates us. We find ourselves within its lineage.
It gives rise to us.
We ascetic selves probably will live out Nietzsche's attack on
the ascetic ideal in embarrassment. It is embarrassing to find oneself in a discourse whose own fearful, timid lineage is laid bare.
Through Nietzsche's discourse the ascetic ideal inspires us with
disgust. We smell ourselves and hurry to hold our noses. But that
does not help, for the very gesture of nose-holding itself is an ascetic
response, a rejection of impurity, a refusal of the corrupt. So, despite
ourselves, the ascetic ideal plays itself out first in our embarrassment
and then in our frustration within its tenacious grip.
Therefore, when Foucault calls us to askesis unapologetically
and without so much as a blush, we have every reason to be surprised,
and somewhat suspicious as well. Just what is Foucault asking us
to submit to? It would seem that he is asking us to participate in the
perpetuation of asceticism's ugly history, a perpetuation all the worse
for its apparent forgetfulness of Nietzsche's thought. But Foucault's
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askesis purports to be other than an insistence upon ascetic
submission to rigid identity structures. It purports to be the very
opposite, in fact-an attempt to think subjectivity in the absence of
transhistorical structure, the pure kernel of the ascetic dream.
However, if this claim to otherness is true, Foucault is engaged in
an apparent paradox. He-a subject, a self, a person with a particular
identity, that man Michel Foucault-is trying to exercise himself in
the thinking of his own contingency, his own optionality. He is
attempting to put himself through an exercise that would constitute
the undergoing of his own dispersal. What are we to make of even
the thought of that?
Cynicism snaps: This call of his for inwardness, selfhood, and
subjectivity to think its historical emergence out of disparate forces
and shameful heterogeneous unions could not possibly emerge from
within the ascetic complex that is modern subjectivity, unlessunless-it is some new ploy, some new strategy for purification.
Perhaps in Foucault's discourse the ascetic will is attempting to
subject itself to a rigid identity in yet a new way; perhaps it is
attempting to think dissension as-its truth.
Foucault has been read that way, as Nietzsche has. Foucault's
askesis can be read as a kind of vengeful attempt to humiliate the
ascetically produced self-identical self by bringing it up against its
real genealogical past. If we were to read Foucault this way we would
understand him to be perpetuating and perhaps developing asceticism
in at least two ways. First, he would be maintaining the notion of
a pure, self-identical truth of the self. In other words, he would still
be positing a constant core, but in this case the core would be
something like the Freudian id, a petty, infantile, frightened little
thing. Second, in addition to positing this pure center of being,
Foucault's discourse would be a perpetuation of asceticism in the
sense that he would be forcing himself, and us, to turn around and
face this puny, ugly little truth that is ourselves; he would be forcing
us to strip away our delusions of grandeur and our pride in order to
be that which we really are; he would be imposing, once again, and
in yet a new and more repulsive way, the rigid standard of absolute
identity. He would be calling us to an ever more honest ownership
of ourselves. (But lest this sound too cruel, let us hasten to add that
in such debasement there is, we must admit, a certain ascetic appeal.)
It would be unwise to discount this reading out of hand-as
though we had some standard of truth against which it failed to
measure up-so we will allow it to stand as a possible reading of
Foucault's text. But there is an instability at the center of that
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reading, an instability that is the reader him- or herself. In order to
read Foucault's discourse as nothing but a perverse perpetuation of
the ascetic ideal we must engage in a bit of ascetic refusal ourselves;
we must insist that a discourse is the product of an author, a subject
who acts. We must reject the possibility that Foucault's discourse itself
might move us beyond the control of the ascetic self who produced
or reads it. In other words, we must insist that there exist logically
separable subjects and objects that stand in relation to each other
as external causes and effects and maintain their identities regardless
of change. But, if we pay careful attention to the transformative
processes of askesis, we realize that that insistence is optional, and
we can begin to undergo the possibility that there are other powers
in this discourse of Foucault's, other voices besides the active, other
grammars besides our Latinate substantive. The only way to find out
is to engage the askesis and allow ourselves to undergo.
We cannot reproduce Foucault's askesis here. However, some
remarks may help us get a feel for some of the directions such an
exercise might begin to take. Foucault's tool is genealogy, the patient,
meticulous tracing of relations offorce. In Foucault's texts-Discipline
and Punish, for example, as well as the sexuality series-what
emerges are coherent, plausible accounts ofthe gradual manufacture
of human selves-sexual selves, law-abiding selves, delinquent selves,
moral selves, beings whose births bear great resemblance to the births
of institutions, practices, and discourses of all kinds.
In Foucault's discourse, a self-like an institution such as a legal
system or a state-is not best understood as something substantial
and enduring. In a certain sense neither a self nor an institution is
a thing at all. Both are better thought as occurrings, innumerable
indiscrete events. Some analogies may be of help.
If one were to make a film of an immobile object stationed in
a windowless room and then were to project that film for an audience,
what the audience would see would be a still image. But the image
would be sustained not by some enduring substance manifesting itself
or deigning to appear. Rather, the image would be sustained by dozens
and perhaps hundreds or thousands of bursts of patterned light. The
apparently stable image would continually occur rather than subsist.
Perhaps a better example is the shape formed when water rushes
down a circular drain. Despite its visibility and regularity, this funnel
shape is not a subsisting thing; it is simply the sensible tension of
a set of forces in play. It exists only as long as those forces maintain
a certain equilibrium. 3
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For Foucault, the world occurs, as the film image and the water
funnel occur, as always changeable sets of repeated force events
clashing against each other or holding each other in tension. We need
posit no subsisting things. We may think among events, as ourselves
events, of the eventful character of seemingly subsistent things. Does
this mean we have thought those things in their truth? Not in this
discourse, if by truth we mean some constant reality, some subsisting
thing. The ascetic insistent upon constancy finds itself in continual
frustration here. There is no constant truth of the ascetic self, not
even an ugly one.
Self, then, as part of the eventful world, is itself eventful. It is
to be thought as a nexus of repeating force events remaining more
or less steady through time. Selves take many different shapes, as
it were, as force events shift, are unable to repeat, or occur at a
reduced level of energy vis-a-vis one another. Nevertheless, the shifts
are usually minor; selves remain identifiable most of the time. This
is to be expected, unless there is some relatively cataclysmic change
in the sustaining patterns of force events. But what ifthere is? Well,
then, selves may be dramatically altered. Some may die. New forms
may be born.
Postcataclysmic arrangements are not predictable; for, in an
eventful world, there are no underlying, hidden laws or structures
that govern change. However, the emergings of arrangements are
often traceable in retrospect. Certain sorts of force networks might
come to show themselves as essential to the maintenance of a given
equilibrium. One might interrogate such a network with regard to
its structure and emergence and so begin to think the history of its
becoming the essence of a particular arrangement or current
equilibric form. 4
Selves, then, have histories, of course, but they also are
historical. They are not subsisting entities to which things happen,
around which events occur; not enduring substances whose manifestations are sometimes deformed or incomplete; selves occur at every
instant, and at every instant their occurring interacts with or conflicts
with, reinforces or disrupts all sorts of other occurrings "in" the
matrices of world-event. Analyses will accordingly be multiple and
complex. Hence genealogy as opposed to a quest for truth.
But back to our first question: must we read Foucault's discourse
as a new and more insidious ascetic trap? As long as we insist upon
reading it-as-an-object, protecting ourselves from its action, remaining
in tight control, perhaps that is all that it can be. Perhaps we will
never read it as anything but a fanciful report on the contents of
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Michel Foucault's mind. But when the discourse begins to stir us,
when the askesis gets underway, something else may very well occur.
A first sign that something else is occurring is the appearance
of fear. Very often, and as Nietzsche no doubt would have predicted,
this fear expresses itself as a desire to maintain social or moral order.
Time after time students and colleagues have voiced to me their fear
that if we cease to hold to the notion that selves have self-identical,
transhistorical cores, we will no longer be able to hold people responsible for what they do. And, if people cannot be held responsible, order
cannot be maintained. Might will equal right, and society will
degenerate into a war of all against all.
One response to that fear might be: what makes you think that
that is not how things are now? But as an initial answer, such would
be a frivolous response. A second, less frivolous response might be
to question the logic of the fear. Does the absence oftranshistorical
subjectivity necessarily result in the preclusion of personal responsibility? The answer to that question is, I think, no, but eventually,
as we undergo Foucault's discourse, the question itself comes to seem
strange and answering it comes to seem beside the point. Nonetheless
it will be instructive to pursue this issue briefly here.
First, we need a better account of the allegedly threatened link
between constant self-identity and personal responsibility. A little
social observation can give us that. Apparently one of the rules of
the game of responsibility assignments is that one should not hold
someone responsible for a situation if that person is other than the
person who brought it about. For example, most people would not be
likely to consent to holding the grandchildren of a murderer
responsible for the murderer's crimes. (Of course, as we know, people
really do hold relatives responsible for the wrongdoing of others.
Entire families are treated with contempt when one family member
offends the public taste. And, without doubt, there are times when
outrage over one incident turns into violence against whoever
happens to get in the injured one's way. But these cases, most would
insist, are regrettable reminders of the imperfections of human beings,
not true exemplars of justice well wrought.) Likewise, many people
would argue that one cannot hold a person responsible for an act if
the person has changed significantly since its commission. When a
prisoner pleads that he was temporarily insane at the time of the act,
he may be understood in part to be claiming that he is not the same
man in some important way, so that to punish him now would be
unjust. We might also understand the sentiment "he has suffered
enough" to mean in part "because of what he has undergone he has
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changed since the time of the egregious act, so it is not appropriate
to hold the person he is now responsible for it." At any rate, it seems
clear that we typically require a person who is to be held responsible
for something to have a fairly stable identity through time. Therefore,
anything we do to undermine our ordinary belief in stable personal
identity cores threatens our ability to hold people responsible for
whatever occurs.
Of course, stability of identity is not the only official prerequisite
for holding someone responsible. In order for us legitimately to hold
a person responsible for something, he or she must be related to it
as its cause. It is officially illicit to blame, for example, the bearer
of bad news. We should reserve our wrath for the person who actually
brought the bad situation about.
Now, some claim that Foucault's historicization of the subject
places in question the notion that there is any stable core, any identity
that would unify the undergoing of punishment with the commitment
of an act. If the transhistorical self is merely a dream of Western man,
then subjective duration is just an illusion, too. Foucault has destroyed
the responsible self.
This, however, is simply not the case. Foucault is not attempting
(primarily, or even necessarily) to dismantle the responsible self; he
is attempting to understand how it came to be, a task whose
presuppositions obviously include a conviction that there do exist such
selves. Foucault's work does not suggest that no one is ever really
responsible for anything; it does suggest that responsibility is
historically formed and its necessary preconditions are maintained
by relations of force. Foucault's primary question is not, how can we
expose and dispose of an illusion?, but rather, how did the real
phenomenon of self-identity come to be and how is it sustained in a
given discursive region? His genealogical analyses of sexuality and
desire are examples of his attempts to understand how forms of selfidentity are constructed and how they are reproduced within networks
of power relations that themselves are unstable and shifting. As we
said before, Foucault's understanding of the self-identical self is that
it is not a persisting entity so much as it is a steady repeating of
relations or events, like the film image or the water funnel.
Of course, even if Foucault leaves us with some shimmering
alternative to the stable responsible self, he may still threaten the
game of responsibility assignments on some other front. If we are to
be able to hold people responsible in the usual ways, we also need
to be able to understand a self as a cause and, furthermore, as a cause
that is not itself totally caused.
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If self is impinged upon by social, historical, or linguistic forces,
then self is not an uncaused cause. Little will eliminate our desire
to hold someone responsible faster than our deciding that the person
was absolutely unable to behave otherwise than he or she did.
Foucault's view seems to eliminate the possibility that selves
are not completely determined by social forces. For, if selves are
maintained at every moment by power networks, then each self must
be at the mercy of the networks that hold it together and make it
up. Therefore the self itself is not responsible for what it does.
However, this way of thinking is not Foucault's. This way of
thinking still assumes that self is somehow independent of the forces
in question. On Foucault's view, self is precisely not something upon
which historical forces act. Self is the networks of forces themselves.
These forces are not causes external to the product they create. Self
simply is those forces in tension with themselves. The analytic
dichotomy inside/outside just breaks down. 5
To reiterate, in order to understand self as not responsible for
any of its acts, we must assume self to be a kind of thing preexisting
the forces that act upon it and external to them. But if self is those
forces or some subset of them, it is not merely being acted upon.
Therefore, while it is true that in Foucault's discourse it is not the
case that self is an uncaused cause, the pure origin of its a posteriori
acts, neither is it the case that self is nothing but the middle billiard
ball in a combination shot. Personal responsibility does not
necessarily go out the window; but it does need to be rethought. (And
I would like to suggest that that might be part of what Foucault was
doing the last years of his life.)
But far more interesting than the idea that Foucault could
answer his critics on more or less their own terms-that he can
perhaps reassure them that the game of responsibility assignments
need not be stopped or lost-is the existence of this threatened posture
itself. We may take this as a clue that, while on some levels Foucault's
discourse may be a perpetuation and development of the power of
ascetic drives, on some level those drives are also threatened with
erosion and possibly undermined. Let us look again at asceticism as
self-transformative practice.
It is the case, within Nietzsche's account, that asceticism
transforms itself as it affirms itself and extends its strength. Ascetic
drives refine themselves, produce ever finer points of distinction as
the sorting process of self and other plays itself out. The ascetic self,
then, undergoes changes as the process intensifies, becoming more
powerful perhaps and ever more rigidly defined. The ascetic self is
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subjected and subjectified by the processes of purification that posit
its ever more carefully delineated identity core. The ascetic self
en-selfs itself by enforcing the continued stability of the identity it
seeks to be. Asceticism is a powerfully paradoxical drive for constant
self-transformation toward a perfect stasis in a pure unity of selfidentical repose.
Foucault's askesis bears great resemblance to the movement of
self-transformative ascetic drives. The ascetic selfs drive to know
itself is certainly apparent in Foucault. And there is a sense in which
in Foucault we encounter a kind of truth, a truth that the self is not
self-identical but rather that it is an amalgamation of disparate forms.
The ascetic self, upon encountering that "truth," upon acceding to
the plausibility of genealogical accounts, begins, predictably enough,
to discipline itself to that self-knowledge, to bring itself into
intellectual conformity with that truth.
But when the drive to purify confronts the "truth" of its own
impurity, when it runs headlong into the contradictory project of
attempting to pare itself down to its fundamental multiplicity, ascetic
selfhood begins to undergo the self-transforming power of Foucault's
discourse, and the valences that held themselves in tension to produce
the notion of a perfect unity, of some enduring Same, must necessarily
shift. The thought of self in the center of Foucault's discourse is the
thought of transgression, a reversal of forces, a gradual or perhaps
violent turning outward of the valences before turned in, like fingers
pulling loose from a stone they have gripped too hard for too long.
It will be necessary to find a different way to speak: When there occurs
the undergoing of the genealogical stripping away of the argumentative and commonsense forces sustaining belief in the unitary self,
when there occurs the undergoing of the exposure ofthe fearful and
nonrational drives that put those beliefs in place, there may occur
a kind of death of the ahistorical self, just as, in Nietzsche's discourse,
when there occurs the undergoing of the exposure of the ungodliness
that supported gods, there occurs a kind of death of the ahistorical
God. As the thought of God loses its power to shape a world, the
thought of a unitary self-identity begins to lose its power to shape
a life.
And what then? Will human being simply fly apart? Will we
all go stark raving mad? Will might equal right and society
degenerate into a war of all against all? Perhaps. But why should
it come that? Selfishness would be a strange thing in a discourse that
did not insist upon the unity of self-identical selves. Perhaps, as
Nietzsche says, morality and evil are Siamese twins.
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Foucault's discourse, then, like ascetic discourses, is a selftransformative exercise. It is an askesis that allows the powers of
ascetic selfhood to bring themselves to bear in characteristic ways.
But because Foucault's discourse draws asceticism to focus its selftransformative power on the drive for purification itself, ascetic
selfhood finds itself in question. Not only does self-transformation
occur here, but there is within the discourse an awareness of this
transformative power and an allowance of it as opposed to a denial
or an attempt at masterful control. Thus, like ascetic discourses,
Foucault's is a discourse that transforms itself; but it transforms itself
from an active production of an agent-subject to a process of selfovercoming that opens possibilities for movements of differing rather
than the continued movement of purification that is an insistence
upon the identity of the same.
Yes, Foucault's discourse begins as and in some ways may be
read as remaining an ascetic discourse. It draws its energy from its
ascetic lineage and past. But within Foucault's discourse ascetic
selfhood cannot maintain control of the direction of its own forceful
drives. Thus, as Foucault's discourse operates upon the forces at its
own discursive center, something other to asceticism may begin to
emerge, something we ascetic selves are not able to name, something
that will resist the ascetic drive to label and identify, but something
the undergoing of which may be either beautiful or terrible or both
but which will definitely be-to use a Nietzschean word-interesting.

Notes
1. Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley, val. 2
of The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 9.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo,
trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books,
1967), First Essay, section 6, p. 32.1t is doubtful that this account of the ascetic
ideal would have emerged for me had it not been for the work of Charles
Scott of Vanderbilt University; in particular, see The Question of Ethics
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1990), chap. 2.
3. After this paper was written I happened to be reading J. Baird
Callicott's In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy
(Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1989), when I ran across the following
quotation from Yale biophysicist Harold Morowitz: "Viewed from the point
of view of modern [ecology], each living thing ... is a dissipative structure,
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that is it does not endure in and of itself but only as a result ofthe continual
flow of energy in the system. An example might be instructive. Consider a
vortex in a stream of flowing water. The vortex is a structure made of an
ever-changing group of water molecules. It does not exist as an entity in the
classical Western sense; it exists only because of the flow of water through
the stream. In the same sense, the structures out of which biological entities
are made are transient, unstable entities with constantly changing molecules,
dependent on a constant flow of energy from food in order to maintain form
and structure.... From this point of view the reality of individuals is
problematic because they do not exist per se but only as local perturbations
in this universal flow." Callicott cites this from Morowitz's "Biology as a
Cosmological Science," in Main Currents in Modern Thought28 (1972): 156.
4. It is important to notice how very differently the word essence
functions in this context from the way it seems to function in classical
contexts. Essence here is the name of whatever historically emerging forces
function to maintain a particular structure and protect it from perversion
or disintegration. Essence does not name the truth of any set of structures
or forces.
5. The breakdown of the dichotomy inside/outside occurs here much
as it does in ecological discourse (compare note 3). Once thinking begins to
occur in the absence of the classical liberal notion of atomic individuality,
the rigid distinction between what is I and what is not-1 (or what is here inside
and what is there outside) carries little force. Perhaps what we are moving
toward is an ecological understanding of human being.

